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SENIORITY AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
KEITH H. ZOOK*
of the Den rer Bar

This article was inspired by a recent Washington case decided
October 16, 1952, in which employees of a power and light company were refused an award of money damages to vindicate their
loss of seniority rights upon the company's sale and transfer of
its business.'
(1952).

The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington on the
question is believed to be the first of its kind. "The question
presented is a new one so far as we have been informed. None of
the authorities cited in the briefs consider any claimed seniority
rights of an employee where the employer has gone out of business . .
2 This action was instituted by Salome E. Wagner
and A. W. Wright individually and in behalf of other employees
of the power and light company to recover damages for a breach
of the collective bargaining contract between their labor union
and the company. This breach came as a result of a transfer of
the defendant company's property to the city of Seattle subsequent to the contract. The propriety of a suit by an individual
upon such a collective bargaining agreement as a contract made
expressly for the employee's benefit is well established by numerous decisions.
The quotation following is that portion of the court's opinion
which is pertinent to the question under our consideration here.
In all of the cases where seniority as a property right
has been considered, the employer was a going concern
and able to recognize and accord to the employee his contractual seniority rights. The business of defendant having been sold and transferred, there no longer exists any
seniority in employment, and the former right thereto
is no longer such a tangible thing
that the loss of it can
3
be measured in terms of money.
"Seniority" has been defined as, "The state of being older
in years, or in office; priority of age, service or rank." 4 That it
is a valuable right as bearing upon the security of an employee
and upon his opportunity to advance can scarcely be doubted. An
employee has no inherent right to seniority but obtains his right
to it through contract. 5 Once such a right has been obtained by
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
9Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co ......
Wash .
, 248 P. 2d 1084
'ibid., at 1085.
'Id.. at 1085.
479 C. J. S. 1041.
Wooldridge v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 118 Colo. 25, 191
P. 2d 882 (1948).
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the employee, .it is generally considered to be a property right in
the sense that an employee may sue for the loss of it when an
employer wrongfully fills a certain position which such employee
is entitled to by virtue of such right with an employee who is
junior in rank or service.
Collective bargaining agreements such as that involved in
Wagner v. Puget Sound 6 commonly contain an "assignability
clause" which provides that in the event of sale, transfer, merger
or other change in the form or management of the business, the
employee's seniority right will continue without interruption. Such
a clause is binding upon the employer's successor; but, even in
the absence of such a clause, the employees are often considered
to be similar to "fixtures" in trade and equipment, and the new
management takes over the employees with whatever their respective lengths of service are at that time.7 There is no apparent reason why seniority rights may not be enforced in the courts
usually employed in the enforceby the application of remedies
8
ment of other legal rights.
Many cases recognize that there is a property right in seniority in and of itself. "Although a right of seniority such as is here
asserted is undoubtedly a valuable property it arises only from
agreement." 9
The recent Colorado case of Wooldrige v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western 10 goes even farther in that it describes the seniority right as a property right in which an employee has a vested
interest. in this case a majority vote of standard-gauge railroad
men in a union committee suddenly divested the narrow-gauge
men of their seniority rights. The court mentions that such action
savors of impairment of contract and the wiping out of vested
interests and goes on to say:
If the contention of the standard-gauge men is that
they have a property right or vested interest, all the
more strongly can it be urged that the narrow-gauge
men have a vested property right under the 1936 contract
whih had been in effective operation for nine years."
The court then goes on to affirm the trial court's judgment in
favor of the narrow-gauge men's seniority rights.
It would seem peculiar to say that a person has a "vested
property right" in a thing called "seniority", and in the same
breath to say that such an interest evaporates into thin air upon
the company's wrongfully disabling itself from performing the
terms of the contract in which seniority provisions are such an
6' upro.
Mitchem,

Seniority Clavses

iM

Collective Bargaining Ag!e" ment.

RocKY MT. L. REv. 180-181 (1949).
' Fine v. Pratt, Ct. of Civ. App. of Tex., 150 S. W. 2d 308 (1941).
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934), p. 708.
"Supra, n. 5.
1Id. at 38. Accord, Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. WV.
1042 (1923).
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integral element. The Puget Sound Power & Light Co., to use
the language of the Washington court, "disabled itself" in this
12
very way by voluntarily selling its property to the city of Seattle.
If the employees suing in Wagner v. Puget Sound 13 had a
vested property interest which was thus destroyed, have they no
remedy for its loss? What would be the result if a corporation
decided to defeat the seniority rights of its employees by an
ostensible "reorganization" in which the employees were forced
to lose all prior seniority rights upon the formation of the "new"
corporation? The result upon the rights of the employees would
be identical in such a situation with the result in the case of a
voluntary sale of its property by a going concern, which not only
cuts short the seniority rights of employees under an existing
contract, but which abrogates them altogether.
Seniority rights are closely bound up with the right and
opportunity to earn a living, which itself has been recognized as
a property right or right of substance in the nature of a property
right, having a pecuniary value :14
This is not an action to recover damages for the
breach of an employment contract measured by loss of
wages that would have been earned had the employment
continued. The amended complaint contains some allegations that would be found in one proceeding upon that
theory, but it is not so framed that, by giving it a liberal
construction to determine whether it states a cause of
action on any theory, we can say that the demurrer should
have been overruled.,
(Italics supplied.)
This language would seem to indicate that the court considers
the complaint as drawn up by the attorney for the plaintiffs in
this case to be inartful and ill-framed. It is possible that there
is a basic misapprehension, not only on the part of the Washington court, but in the minds of many attorneys and businessmen
as well, as to the exact nature of seniority rights. "Seniority
rights do not affect the wage but they do affect very materially
the character of the employment ....
".
16 The "choice-of-jobs"
feature of seniority rights is directly related to an employee's
opportunities for advancement and his ultimate happiness in his
work, both of which are in entirely different categories from that
of wages alone.
The material cited thus far would clearly seem to indicate
that seniority is not a mere concept or intangible interest, but
rather a valuable property right; as such it would seem to deserve
protection by the courts. If the basis for denial of recovery in
12Wagner v.

Puget Sound Power & Light Co ........ Wash ........
248

P.

2d

1084 (1952).
"

Ibid.
DE FUNIAI,

HA.NrnooK OF MODER- EQUITY, 33 (1950).
.Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co ........
Wash .......
248 P. 2d 1084
(1952), at 1085.
"Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. IV. 210 (1922), 211.
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Wagner v. Puget Sound 17 be that the complaint by the plaintiffs
indicates damages whereas it should have stated another remedy,
the question would arise as to what other theory the plaintiffs'
claim for relief should be predicated upon.
An injunction would appear to be a possible approach for
these plaintiffs although success would be somewhat doubtful on
the basis of decisions dealing with the attempts to gain injunctive
relief in other cases. One court has said that since equity will
not decree the specific performance of contracts for personal
services, it will not decree specific performance of the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement relating to seniority rights. 18
On the other hand it has been said concerning a collective bargaining contract involving seniority rights that the contract is
not one for personal services since it does not bind the employer
to hire any particular member because of its collective bargaining
aspect.' The conflict expressed in the two statements seems too
obvious to bear further discussion.
In Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 20 it is stated that, except where an employee's services are unique, no injunction to
enforce the collective bargaining contract or the seniority rights
thereunder is possible. The court continues by stating that the
only remedy in such a case is damages. The court in Harper v.
Local Union No. 520 21 mentions that some state courts hold that
the remedy at law for breach of seniority provisions by an employer is adequate and that therefore no injunction should be
permitted.
Upon examination of the adequacy of the remedy at law,
one finds a case like Gary v. Central of Georgia
namely 2 damages,
Ry. Co. 2 wherein it was held that damages to enginemen for loss
of seniority rights were too remote and speculative to support an
action for wrongful discharge; however, the court continued by
saying that the remoteness resulted from the fact that the injury
to the plaintiffs could not be attributed solely to the railway company's breach of contract.
In the case of Capra v. Local Lodge,23 the court held that the
17 Svpra.

"Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P. 2d 404 (1935).
9Harper v. Local Union No. 520, Ct. of Civ. App. of Tex., 48 S. W. 2d 1033

(1935).
20 Supra.
Sitpra.
- Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 37 Ga. App. 733, 141 S. E. 819 (1928).
Accord. Harper v. Local Union No. 520, supra.
"' Capra v. Local Lodge No. 273 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
21

and Enginemen, 102 Colo. 63, 76 Pfl 2d 738 (1938).
The Gary case describes the amount of damages as "usually" being ineasured by the employee's actual loss in wages up to the time of trial with no
recovery for loss of seniority rights even where the employee is wrongfully
discharged by the employer because of the speculative nature of such damages
and the difficulty of computing them. But cf. Wagner x. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co ........ Wash .......-, 248 P. 2d 1084 (1952), at 1085, where it is said
that: "In other cases the employee has been wrongfully discharged and has
been allowed damages based upon the compenetion paid to one of his rank."
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plaintiff employee was not entitled to a mandatory injunction enforcing his claimed seniority rights because the contract between
the union and the D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co. did not cover the new
Moffat Tunnel line on which the plaintiff was currently employed.
There is a strong implication in this opinion, however, that
if this branch line were covered by the contract that a mandatory
injunction would be proper remedy for the plaintiff.
This Colorado case finds a supporting precedent in Gleason
v. Thomas,2 4 in which it was held that an injunction restraining
enforcement of an order of the board of directors of the union
abolishing seniority rights was proper, for those rights, secured
through the efforts of the union, are such property rights as a
court of equity will enforce and protect. The court continues by
stating, in accord with Harper v. Local Union No. 520,25 that its
decree is proper and is not one for specific performance because
the plaintiffs may work or not as they choose.
CONCLUSION

The result reached by the court in Wagner v. Puget Sound 2t;
is probably a proper one in view of the fact that the defendant
company was no longer in a position to retain the employees;
however, since it was through no fault of the employees that
their seniority rights were lost, it would appear that the court
should hesitate in letting the defendant company breach its existing contract with impunity simply because the mere difficulty of
assessing damages is an additional escape to the admittedly arduous task of determining the exact nature of the plaintiffs' loss.
"Where there is a right there is a remedy." If the Washingtoncourt had clearly stated that the plaintiffs had no remedy the
decision would be clearer, but as the case stands there is a strong
indication by the court that if the complaint were drawn differently the plaintiffs might recover under some theory. Assuming
that the plaintiffs had a vested property right in this case, should
their loss of it go uncompensated for the reasons which the Washington court gives?
This article is intended to demonstrate the present confusion
and conflict which prevails with respect to the effect given to the
seniority provisions in collective bargaining contracts. It is hoped
that it will also indicate not only the need of a more uniform and
comprehensible treatment of this question in the future, but also
point out a possible approach from the property right theory. If
the interest of the practicing attorney has been in any way stimulated with respect to the effect to be given these increasingly
frequent seniority clauses by the court through this article, it
has served its purpose.
2

1 Gleason

v. Thomas, 117 W. Va. 550, 186 S. E. 304 (1936).

1 Supra.
2'Note 12, supra.

